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Abstract 
 
We address models that can explain why expert patients (obstetricians, midwives and 
doctors) are treated better than non-experts (mainly non-medical training). Models of 
statistical discrimination show that benevolent doctors treat expert patients better, since 
experts are better at communicating with the doctor. Agency theory suggests that doctors 
have an incentive to limit hospital costs by distorting information to non-expert patients, 
but not to expert patients. 
 
The hypotheses were tested on a large set of data, which contained information about the 
highest education of the parents, and detailed medical information about all births in 
Norway during the period 1967 to 2005 (Medical Birth Registry). The empirical analyses 
show that expert parents have a higher rate of Caesarean section than non-expert parents. 
The educational disparities were considerable 40 years ago, but have become markedly 
less over time. The analyses provide support for statistical discrimination theory, though 
agency theory cannot be totally excluded. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A typical patient has neither adequate information about his or her medical situation nor 
about the effectiveness of alternative treatment. Most patients are non-experts, and have 
little choice but to rely on the advice and recommendations provided by doctors. In 
contrast, the expert patient knows as much about medical diagnosis and treatment as the 
physician. The nearest one comes to an expert patient is a doctor who is sick, and who 
needs to be examined and treated. Our research question is whether expert patients are 
treated in the same way as non-expert patients, and whether diagnostic technology can 
reduce potential differences between the two groups. 
 
We tested our research question using a large and unique set of data, which contains 
information about the highest education of the parents, and detailed medical information 
about all births in Norway during the period 1967 to 2005. Our main finding is that 
expert parents (i.e. parents who have medical training: obstetricians, midwives and 
doctors) have a higher rate of Caesarean section than non-expert parents (mainly non-
medical training). These educational disparities3
 
 were considerable 40 years ago, but 
have become markedly less over time.  
We suggest two alternative explanations for the observed disparities in rate of Caesarean 
section. The first explanation addresses mothers’ ability to communicate their symptoms 
and preferences to the obstetrician (“statistical discrimination”). If complications arise, 
the expert mother is in a better position to communicate her symptoms and which method 
of delivery she prefers to the obstetrician. The benevolent obstetrician takes her 
assessment into account, which implies that the mother is more likely to have a Caesarean 
section than a non-expert mother. The second explanation is that the mother who gives 
birth and the obstetrician have conflicting interests. Obstetricians want to minimize the 
number of Caesarean sections, while mothers do not (“agency discrimination”). Due to 
asymmetric information, non-expert mothers can be persuaded to have vaginal deliveries 
rather than Caesarean sections.  
 
Below we briefly outline the theories of statistical discrimination and agency 
discrimination as they apply to obstetric services. The most relevant empirical studies are 
                                                 
3 Throughout the paper we use the term “disparities” to describe variation based on whether parents have 
medical training or not. 
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reviewed, before the data and the analyses are described. Finally, the results are reported 
and discussed. 
 
  
2. Theory and background: statistical discrimination versus agency discrimination   
 
The two theoretical models can be used to understand the interaction between 
obstetricians and the mothers who give birth. Both models underscore the role of 
information, but in completely different ways.  
 
 
2.1  Statistical discrimination and obstetric services 
 
The statistical discrimination model assumes that patients send noisy signals to the 
doctor, which lead to “statistical discrimination”. Imprecise signals make it difficult for 
physicians to match treatment with patients’ actual health conditions and health care 
needs. Information flows from the patient to the physician. The doctor receives a signal 
from the patient, and uses the signal to update his or her prior estimate of the severity of 
the patient’s condition. Some patients give more ambiguous signals than others. Patients 
who send a precise signal will receive the most appropriate treatment. Clinical 
uncertainty about diagnosis and treatment favours expert patients because they are more 
able to interpret and communicate their symptoms to the doctor, that is they send more 
precise signals than non-expert patients. 
 
Balsa and McGuire (2001, 2003) have made the central theoretical contribution to how 
statistical discrimination theory applies to health services. Their contribution is based on 
labour market modelling (Aigner and Cain, 1977). There are few studies where statistical 
discrimination theory have been tested empirically, but the studies that exist support the 
theory (Balsa et al., 2005; Lutfey and Ketcham, 2005; McGuire et al., 2008). For 
example, Balsa et al. (2005) and McGuire et al. (2008) found that ethnic minority patients 
are less likely than whites to be diagnosed with depression. This is partly because whites 
communicate their symptoms better to the doctor than minorities.  
 
An underlying assumption of their model is that doctors are altruistic agents for their 
patients. In addition, the model assumes that patients with the same diagnosis are equally 
likely to benefit from the same type of treatment. Further assumptions are that expert 
patients send more precise signals than non-expert patients, and that the average patient 
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does not benefit from a particular type of treatment or type of service. Only when the 
level of severity of the condition is high (above a certain threshold) can treatment be 
expected to be effective. Most patients are expected to be below the threshold level. 
 
To a large extent the above conditions are fulfilled for mothers who give birth. Most 
births run a normal course, and the mother and child are well after the birth. For example, 
in Norway more than 80 per cent of mothers have uncomplicated deliveries, that is they 
are below the threshold level (Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2008). But in some 
cases there are complications, and it can be appropriate to deliver the child by Caesarean 
section (Kolås et al., 2003). When complications occur, there will often be uncertainty 
about the seriousness of the situation, and therefore it may not always be clear which 
method of delivery should be chosen (Fuglenes et al., 2009; Ecker and Frigoletto, 2007; 
O’Leary et al., 2007). Obstetricians do not observe the medical condition directly (for 
example the health of the foetus), but only the symptoms of the condition.  
 
However, the obstetrician’s decision is not only based on objective observation of 
symptoms, but also on the mother’s subjective interpretation and assessment of the 
situation (Habiba et al., 2006). Here, the expert patient has an advantage. She will be 
more able to register and assess the implications of symptoms for her health and her 
child’s health than the non-expert patient, and will probably also be more able to 
communicate her assessment to the obstetrician. Further, we expect that the well-
informed mother is more able to respond to the information she receives from the 
obstetrician, and to participate in the decision process about choice of method of delivery 
than a mother who is not so well informed. This means that the expert patient is probably 
more able to communicate which method of delivery she prefers. The research question is 
thus whether this is actually reflected in the method of delivery that is offered. 
 
 
2.2 Agency discrimination and obstetric services 
 
The agency model assumes that there is a conflict of interest between the doctor and the 
patient. Because the patient is poorly informed, the doctor has the possibility to influence 
both the diagnosis and the type of services that are provided. The model assumes that 
information flows from the doctor to the patient, and that the doctor can exploit the 
information advantage.  
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In several studies on maternity care, agency theory is the point of departure. One issue 
that has been raised is whether obstetricians take their own private economic interests 
into account when deciding on type of delivery (for example see: Gruber and Owings, 
1996; Tussing and Wojtowycz, 1992; Keeler and Brodie, 1993; Grant, 2009). Most of the 
studies are from the United States, Brazil, Chile, Taiwan and Korea (Henderson et al., 
2001). The rate of Caesarean section is high in all these countries, and many maternity 
services are privately funded and organized (Henderson et al., 2001; Stephenson et al., 
1993; Leone et al., 2008). 
 
The main idea behind the principal agent model is illustrated in the much cited study by 
Gruber and Owings (1996). During the period 1970 to 1982, the birth rate in the USA fell 
by 13.5 per cent. In order to prevent a fall in revenue, obstetricians compensated by 
carrying out more Caesarean sections, which generate more income than vaginal 
deliveries. In a similar study, Gruber et al. found a positive and significant relationship 
between fees for Caesarean section and the number of Caesarean sections that were 
carried out (Gruber et al., 1999). Several other studies from the 1980s and the 1990s also 
found that the rate of Caesarean section was influenced by how doctors were remunerated 
or how hospitals were funded (Tussing and Wojtowycz, 1992; Stafford, 1990; Ransom et 
al., 1996). 
 
The organization of maternity care in Norway is quite different from in the USA. In 
Norway, women give birth in publically-owned and publically-funded hospitals (Ministry 
of Health, 2002)4
 
. Doctors receive a fixed salary and have no personal economic 
advantage by carrying out a Caesarean section rather than a normal delivery. There is 
little competition between hospitals for women giving birth. The country is divided into 
hospital areas in which the capacity of maternity units is planned according to the 
expected number of births within the catchment area. Mothers pay no fee, irrespective of 
the type of delivery.  
Due to strict budget control, hospitals have incentives to keep costs down (Hagen, 1997; 
Dalen et al., 2002). Both international and national studies show that the cost of a 
Caesarean section is about twice the cost of an ordinary delivery (Gazmarian and Koplan, 
1998; Mathisen et al., 2002). Therefore, one way to keep costs down is to keep the rate of 
Caesarean section low. This is also the case in Norway, where the rate of Caesarean 
                                                 
4 During the period 1967 to 2001 hospitals were owned by the counties and financed by county government 
grants (Nerland, 2001). There are 19 counties in Norway. Before 1980 the counties financed the hospitals on 
a per diem basis, from 1980 a block grant system was introduced. From 2001 hospitals have been owned and 
financed by the State. 
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section is low compared to in many other countries (Tollånes, 2009). If the obstetrician 
takes the interests of the hospital into account, he or she may persuade mothers to have 
vaginal deliveries rather than Caesarean sections5
 
. The obstetrician then acts more as an 
agent for the hospital than the mother. Different strategies can be used. For example, the 
obstetrician may overstate the probability of medical complications of Caesarean section 
(Jackson and Paterson-Brown, 2001; Häger et al., 2004; Wagner, 2000; Deneux-Tharaux 
et al., 2006; Hall and Bewley, 1999). Often mothers are anxious about giving birth. Then 
the obstetrician may try to calm down a nervous mother by understating the risk of 
complications with an ordinary delivery.  
The obstetrician’s possibility to persuade mothers to have vaginal deliveries rather than 
Caesarean sections is likely to depend on the mothers’ level of education. When the 
mother has compulsory school education, the obstetrician can be more persuasive than for 
example when parents have university education. Expert mothers are likely to be difficult 
to persuade6
 
. The implication is the same as from statistical discrimination theory: we 
expect expert parents to have a higher rate of Caesarean section than non-expert parents.  
 
2.3 Diagnostic technology and reduction in clinical uncertainty 
 
To distinguish between “statistical discrimination” and “agency discrimination”, we 
investigated the influence of new diagnostic technology. There has been a rapid 
development in diagnostic technology in maternity care during the last decades. These 
advances have improved foetal monitoring both before and during delivery (for an 
overview of different technologies see: Norwegian Society for Gynaecology and 
Obstetrics, 2008). We focussed on four diagnostic tools that we assessed to be important 
in obstetrics, and that have been introduced at different times in maternity units during 
the 39 years that we have data for (Norwegian Society for Gynaecology and Obstetrics, 
2008; Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2007). 2-dimensional ultrasound was 
introduced early in the period, and is used to check foetal circulation and anatomy, both 
before and during the delivery. Cardiotocography, ST waveform analysis (STAN) and 
foetal blood analyses were introduced later in the period. These technologies are used to 
                                                 
5 For example, The Norwegian System of Compensation to Patients has documented cases where a Caesarean 
section should have been done rather than an ordinary delivery (The Norwegian System of Compensation to 
Patients, 2008). 
6 This also applies when mothers do not want to have a Caesarean section. For example, some mothers wish 
to be in control of their birth, or they wish to avoid a medical procedures. In these cases it may be difficult to 
persuade a mother to have a Caesarean section even though it is indicated on the basis of risk factors. 
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register foetal distress, a condition that can lead to lack of oxygen, and for which 
Caesarean section may be indicated.  
 
Use of diagnostic technology has reduced clinical uncertainty, so that the obstetrician is 
less dependent on judgment and interpretation of information from the mother for 
assessing whether the delivery is progressing without complications. According to 
statistical discrimination theory, better diagnostic technology should lead to smaller 
differences in Caesarean section rates between experts and non-experts.  
 
According to agency theory, obstetricians have to take the interests of the hospital into 
account and keep the rate of Caesarean section low. In principle, new information could 
enhance patients’ control over their physician. We believe that this is not very likely. The 
reason is that interpretation of test results requires a great deal of medical competence 
and experience. The results may be difficult to interpret, conflicting test results must 
often be assessed in relation to each other, and there may be little time to loose from 
when test results are available to when the obstetrician has to decide which type of 
delivery is most appropriate (Rosén et al., 2004; Williams and Arulkumaran, 2004).  
 
A woman who is about to give birth has neither the mental state (she may be in pain, or 
may have been given a general anaesthetic), nor the medical knowledge to interpret her 
test results. For example, an understanding of the anatomy and physiology of the heart is 
needed in order to interpret the results of cardiography. Signs that something is wrong are 
based on a deviation from “a baseline fetal heart rate frequency between 110-150 beats 
per minute, presence of periodic accelerations, a normal heart rate variability between 5-
25 beats per minute and the absence of decelerations” (Rooth et al., 1987; Van Geijn, 
1998). The interpretation of foetal blood analyses is based on the physiology of the blood 
and respiration. A pH value greater than 7.25 indicates that the birth is proceeding 
normally (National Collaborating Centre for Women’s and Children’s Health, 2007). A 
pH value under 7.20 is a sign of acidosis, which is an indication to speed up the birth. ST 
waveform analysis is used in the case of high-risk births. Deviation from normal 
progression is assessed, among other things, on the basis of T/QRS gradient in the 
electrocardiogram of the foetus. This is complicated technology that requires advanced 
skills (Amer-Wahlin et al., 2007; Luzietti et al., 1999).  
 
Internationally, regular training of personnel who use cardiotocography is recommended 
to prevent incorrect interpretation (Williams and Arulkumaran, 2004). In Norway, 
authorized education and certification, and continual follow up and training are required 
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for people who use ST waveform analysis (Eikeland et al., 2008). Therefore, in our 
opinion, new technology is of no or limited help to the non-expert parent to control the 
advice or decisions of the obstetrician. New diagnostic technology is not likely to hinder 
obstetricians if they need to persuade non-expert parents. Therefore, if the data show that 
educational disparities persist after the introduction of new technology, we have 
empirical support for the agency theory. If the data show that differences in Caesarean 
section rates decrease over time, this supports statistical discrimination theory.  
 
 
3.     Materials and methods 
 
3.1 The source of the data and the variables 
 
The analyses were carried out on data from the Medical Birth Registry of Norway (MFR) 
for the period 1967 to 2005, for approximately 2.25 million births (www.fhi.no). Since 
1967, all maternity units have had a duty to report all births to MFR (Irgens, 2000). On 
the registration form, the personal identification numbers of the child and the parents are 
recorded. This made it possible to merge the data from MFR with three data registers in 
Statistics Norway. The first register, the Norwegian Standard Classification of Education 
(Statistics Norway, 2000), contains information about the highest education for all 
Norwegians from 1967. The second register, the Health Personnel Register, contains data 
about medical specialty (Köber, 2004). Data from this register were used to identify 
obstetricians. The third register contains information about immigrant background for all 
first generation immigrants (Statistics Norway, 2009). 
 
Information about use of diagnostic technology was collected by using a questionnaire 
that was sent to all senior consultants in every maternity unit in all the hospitals in the 
country7. The senior consultants were asked to record the year in which the unit began to 
use the following different types of technology regularly: 2-dimensional ultrasound, 
cardiotocography, ST waveform analysis (STAN) and foetal blood analyses. The 
response rate was high. 44 of 46 senior consultants replied. During the 39 years covered 
by our study, some maternity units have been closed down8
                                                 
7 The survey was carried out by the Norwegian Medical Association’s Research Institute. 
, so that it was not possible to 
send a questionnaire to them. Therefore, analyses with the technology variables could 
8 This corresponds well with the number of hospitals that have been closed down, since most hospitals have a 
maternity unit. From 1970 to 2000 the number of maternity units was reduced from 150 to 57 (Nilsen et al., 
2001). The greatest reduction has been for units with less than 500 deliveries per year. 
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only be done for maternity units that have existed for the whole period 1967-2005. We 
have data for approximately 1.5 million births distributed among 44 maternity units.  
 
 
3.2    The model specification 
 
The data were analysed using binary logistic regression. A simplified way of writing the 
basic regression equation is: 
 
Log[pimt/(1- pimt )]= α0 + α1 obstetricianimt + α2 midwifeimt + α3 doctorimt   
            + α4 university/collegeimt + α5 upper secondary schoolimt   
+  β medical control variablesimt  
                                                + λ maternity unit control variablesmt  + γ yeart  + εim     (1) 
 
where the subscript i denotes the mother, m denotes the maternity unit and t denotes year, 
and pimt  denotes the probability that the mother will give birth by means of a Caesarean 
section. Year is a continuous variable starting in 1967 (Year1967 =0) and ending in 2005 
(Year2005 =38). In some specifications, we used fixed effects for individual years. All 
models are estimated by multilevel logistic regression to take into account the clustering 
of births into maternity unit years. The estimation procedure allows for non-zero error 
term correlations within individual maternity unit years. 
 
We included five dummy variables for education in the regression. They measure 
educational level for the parent that has the highest education. The highest educational 
level is when one or both parents are obstetricians. They are regarded as super experts. 
The other variables that measure medical training, are whether one or both parents are 
midwives, or whether one or both parents are doctors. Whether one or both parents have 
university/college or upper secondary education is a measure of non-medical training. 
The lowest educational level is when the mother and father have only compulsory school 
education (= the reference category). They are non-experts, and are expected to have the 
lowest probability to have a Caesarean section. The probability for mothers in the other 
educational levels to have a Caesarean section is expected to fall as educational level 
falls. 
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Important control variables are characteristics of the health status of the mother and 
child9
 
 (Table 1) (Epstein and Nicholson, 2009; Gregory et al., 2002; Henry et al., 1995; 
Kolås et al., 2003; Norwegian Institute of Public Health, 2008). Older mothers have a 
Caesarean section more often than younger mothers, and small and large babies are more 
often delivered by Caesarean section than babies of average weight. Measures of health 
status of the mother which are likely to increase the probability for a Caesarean section 
are: whether the mother has asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, heart disease, chronic 
hypertension, chronic kidney failure, rheumatoid arthritis, if preeclampsia is a 
complication and bleeding during pregnancy. The probability for a Caesarean section 
also increases if the foetus has an abnormal presentation, if the birth is a multiple birth,  
and if the mother has previously had a Caesarean section. Non-western immigrants often 
come from countries where it is more common to have a Caesarean section than in 
Norway. These mothers can therefore have a higher rate of Caesarean section than 
Norwegian mothers (Vangen et al., 2000). 
In all the estimations in Tables 3 and 5, we include all the educational variables and 
control variables. In addition, we present several other specifications of Equation 1. 
There are two main differences between them10
 
. 
The first main difference is whether the maternity units are included as fixed effects or 
not. In Table 3 Columns I, II and III, two variables are included that reflect the obstetric 
competence of the maternity unit directly in the regression: the number of births in total 
per year, and the number of Caesarean sections per year. A large maternity unit will have 
more experience and competence to deal with complicated deliveries than a small unit. 
This has two effects. On the one hand, units with a high level of competence can carry 
out more complicated deliveries as normal deliveries instead of by Caesarean section. 
The result can be that there are relatively fewer Caesarean sections in large units than in 
small units (Lin et al., 2004; Lin and Xirasagar, 2004). This is measured by the variable 
number of births, which is therefore expected to be negative. But on the other hand, large 
units will have more referrals for complicated deliveries, which can lead to relatively 
more Caesarean sections (Liu et al., 2007). This is measured by the variable number of 
Caesarean sections which is therefore expected to be positive. In Table 3, Columns IV 
and V, the effects of the competence and experience of the maternity unit are not 
estimated directly. Here, the maternity units are included as fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity between the maternity units. 
                                                 
9 Several of the medical conditions mentioned below are correlated with slow or no progress in labour or 
signs of foetal distress. A Caesarean section can then be indicated to prevent damage to the child. 
10 Some other minor differences in the specifications are described in the results section. 
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The second main difference is whether an additive model is specified or not. In Table 3, 
Columns I, II and IV, and in Table 5 Columns I-III, we have estimated additive models. 
Here, the regression coefficients for the educational level variables show the mean 
effects for the whole period 1967-2005. However, we also wished to study how the 
effects of educational level changed over time, and the effect of introducing the use of 
new technology in the maternity units. Therefore, we specified two new regressions, one 
of them with an interaction term between each educational level variable and year 
(linear) (Equation 2), the other with an interaction term between each educational level 
variable and technology (Equation 3).  
 
 
Log[pimt/(1-pimt)] = α0 + α1 obstetricianimt + α2 midwifeimt + α3doctorimt              (2) 
                             + α4 university/collegeimt +  α5 upper secondary schoolimt   
        + β medical control variablesimt  
                                           + λ maternity unit control variablesmt  + γ yeart 
     + α6 obstetricianimt · yeart + α7 midwifeimt · yeart  
       + α8 doctorimt · yeart  + α9 university/collegeimt · yeart  
     + α10 upper secondary schoolimt · yeart + εimt 
 
 
Log[pimt/(1-pimt)]) = α0 + α1 obstetricianimt + α2 midwifeimt + α3 doctorimt        (3) 
                              + α4 university/collegeimt + α5 upper secondary schoolimt  
                           + β medical control variablesimt  
                                             + λ maternity unit control variablesmt + γ yeart +τ technologymt  
      + α6 obstetricianimt · technolgymt + α7 midwifeimt · technologymt  
      + α8 doctorimt · technologymt  
         + α9 university/collegeimt · technologymt   
      + α10 upper secondary schoolimt · technologymt 
 
For the latter specification, we used an additive index, which was constructed from each 
of the four technology variables11
                                                 
11 We also estimated an interaction model between the five educational level variables and the four 
technology variables, which resulted in 15 regression coefficients for all the interaction terms. We have 
chosen to present the results from the estimation of the technology index, since the result is then easier to 
present and to interpret. The signs of the 15 regression coefficients mainly correspond with the signs of the 
interaction terms in Equation 3. 
. The index has values from 0 (no technology is used) 
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to 4 (all four types of technology are used). If diagnostic technology reduces clinical 
uncertainty, we would expect the effects of the interaction terms to be negative. 
 
 
3.3    The agency model – an additional test with data over a limited period of time 
 
A direct measure of the pressure obstetricians experience to ration the number of 
Caesarean deliveries is the hospital’s financial status. For each hospital, information is 
available for hospital revenue per bed, for a limited period (1976-1999) 12
 
. We have used 
this information to carry out an alternative test of the agency model. According to the 
theory, we expect that low revenue per bed for a hospital means that the obstetricians 
carry out fewer Caesarean sections for non-expert mothers than for expert mothers. The 
reason for this is the same as previously: non-expert mothers are likely to be easier to 
persuade than expert mothers. This can be tested using the following regression model: 
Log[pimt/(1-pimt)] = α0 + α1 medicalimt + α2 university/collegeimt        (4) 
                             + α3 upper secondary schoolimt  + β medical control variablesimt  
                                           + λmt  + γ yeart  + δ hospital revenue per bedmt 
     + α4 medicalimt · hospital revenue per bedmt   
     + α5 university/collegeimt · hospital revenue per bedmt   
             + α6 upper secondary schoolimt · hospital revenue per bedmt + εimt 
 
The variable medical includes the parent whose highest qualification is either obstetrician, 
doctor or midwife13
 
. The variable that measures hospital revenue per bed was transformed 
into natural logarithms, as this gives the elasticity of the odds of having a Caesarean 
section with respect to hospital revenue per bed. The model was estimated with fixed 
effects for hospital and year. If the regression coefficients α4 to α6 are almost equal to 0, 
the agency model is weakened. Variation in the rate of Caesarean section between 
educational groups is then not influenced by the hospitals’ financial situation.  
 
 
                                                 
12 We do not have corresponding data for the years before 1976. Data for the years after 1999 are  not 
comparable with data for previous years because of a hospital reform, which involved changes to the 
accounting system.  
13 We constructed this variable because the number of observations for each educational group was too small 
for reliable statistical testing over the relatively short period of time. 
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4. Results 
 
  4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The percentage of Caesarean sections increased from 1.8 per cent in 1967 to 16.5 per 
cent in 2005 (Table 1). There has also been a marked increase in parents’ educational 
level. The percentage of parents where either the mother or the father or both have a 
university/college education increased from 17.4 per cent in 1967 to 55.6 per cent in 
2005. This was followed by a corresponding decrease in the percentage where both of the 
parents have compulsory school education only. The percentage of parents where one or 
both parents had a medical training also increased quite a lot during the study period. For 
example, the percentage of parents where either the mother or the father or both had 
medical training was only 0.52  per cent (n=346) in 1967. The corresponding figure in 
2005 was 1.90 per cent (n=1072). The odds for Caesarean section have increased for all 
educational groups from 1967 to 2005 (Figure 1). The increase was greatest before 1988. 
After this the increase tailed off. For all years the odds for Caesarean section are highest 
for midwives and doctors. The differences between those with upper secondary school 
and compulsory school education are small14
 
.  
There has been a clear increase in several of the risk factors for Caesarean section (Table 
1). In particular, the age of the mother has increased. For example, the proportion of 
women aged 31-40 years of age increased from 20.5 per cent in 1967 to 43.2 per cent in 
2005. Also, the weight of babies has increased. The percentage of babies weighing 4 
kilograms or more increased from 16.5 per cent in 1967 to 19.7 per cent in 2005. There 
has also been an increase in the proportion of foetuses with an abnormal presentation, 
and the proportion of mothers with preeclampsia. 
 
In 1967, only 0.2 per cent of mothers were non-western immigrants, but this increased to 
12.7 per cent in 2005. The proportion of births during weekends has decreased slightly. 
Both the number of births and the number of Caesarean deliveries has increased per 
maternity unit from 1967 to 2005. This has occurred because some small hospitals, and 
thus some maternity units, have been amalgamated to form larger units (Nilsen et al., 
2001). 
 
                                                 
14 The odds varied a lot from one year to the next for obstetricians. This variation is likely to reflect random 
fluctuations  rather than any systematic differences in the rate of Caesarean section from one year to the 
other. The reason is the low number of obstetricians who have Caesarean sections during a year. We 
therefore decided not to include obstetricians in Figure 1.  
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The use of diagnostic technology has increased considerably from 1967 to 2005. By the 
end of the study period 2-dimensional ultrasound and cardiotocography were in use in all 
maternity units. Foetal blood analyses was the type of technology that was used the least 
in 2005. About 70 per cent of the maternity units had this type of technology. 
 
In Table 2 we present the distribution of some important explanatory variables according 
to the educational status of the mother. In particular, there are large variations according 
to the age of the mother, and whether the mother has a western background or not. 
Mothers with high education are older than those with low education when they give 
birth. For example, 34 percent of obstetricians are over 35 years old, but the proportion is 
only 6.9 percent for those with compulsory school education. 5.2 percent of those who 
have compulsory school education are non-western immigrants. The corresponding 
proportion for those with university/college education is 2.5 percent. For western 
immigrants, the pattern is the opposite. The proportion for those with high education is 
higher than for those with low education. 
 
Birthweight is also unevenly distributed according to the educational status of the mother 
(Table 2).  5.4 percent of mothers with compulsory school education give birth to 
children with low birthweight (< 2500 g). The corresponding proportion for mothers with 
university/college education is 3.8 percent. The pattern for large babies (> 3500 g) is the 
opposite. Mothers with high education give birth to the largest babies. In Table 2 we  
have also included some health variables for the mother. The proportion of mothers with 
epilepsy is higher for mothers with compulsory school education than for mothers with  
university/college education. This pattern is the opposite for mothers with chronic 
hypertension and chronic kidney failure. There are small differences between educational 
groups for diabetes. 
 
 
4.2   Do expert parents have more Caesarean sections than others? 
 
In Table 3, Columns I, II and IV, we present the results for the additive effects of 
education. Parents with compulsory school education only (the reference group) have the 
lowest rate of Caesarean section. Parents with upper secondary school education and 
with university/college education have a higher rate, doctors and midwives have even 
higher rates, and obstetricians have the highest rate of Caesarean section. For example, 
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the odds ratio for having a Caesarean section is 1.6415
 
 for obstetricians and 1.09 for 
parents with upper secondary school education.  
All the additive effects for each of the educational groups are statistically significantly 
different from the reference group (compulsory school education) at conventional levels 
(p<0.05). In Table 4, we also present significance tests for pairwise comparisons of the 
educational groups. Midwives and doctors do not differ significantly (p=0.68). 
Otherwise, the tests demonstrate that the educational groups have different rates of 
Caesarean section. These results support the hypothesis that the probability for Caesarean 
section falls as medical competence falls. Patients who can be regarded as super experts 
are more likely to have a Caesarean section. 
 
In Model I, year is assumed to have a linear effect on Caesarean sections, while Model II 
allows for non-linear year effects. The effects of education are only marginally lower in 
the latter specification. Model IV differs from Models I and II, as it includes fixed effects 
for hospitals. Again, model specifications appear to have little bearing on the estimates of 
the educational variables.  
 
 
4.3    Do disparities between expert and non-expert parents in rates of Caesarean section     
  decrease over time? 
 
In Table 3, Columns III and V we present the results where we have included interaction 
terms for education and year. While the regressions in Columns I, II and IV give mean 
effects for the whole period, in the interaction models we can study developments over 
time. Year is coded as zero for the first year. This implies that we can assess disparities in 
1967 by ignoring the interaction terms, and study the direct effects of the education 
variables in Models III and V. Since these estimates are much higher than the mean 
effects obtained in Models I, II and IV, we see that the disparities were highest in 1967. 
For example, in 1967 obstetricians were 2.3 times more likely to have a Caesarean 
section than mothers with compulsory school education only.  
 
The interaction terms are negative, which means that the educational disparities in the 
rates for Caesarean section decline over time. Note however that the sizes of the 
interaction terms for obstetricians are relatively low and not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, both in Model III and Model V. The speed of convergence is highest 
                                                 
15 This follows from exponentiatin  0.494.  
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for midwives and doctors, and lowest for parents with upper secondary school education 
(Table 3, Columns III and V and Table 416
 
)  
To illustrate the development over time, we compared the odds ratios for 1967 and 2005 
(Figure 2). The odds ratios are: for obstetricians  2.28 (1967) and 1.21 (2005); for 
midwives 2.48 (1967) and 0.85 (2005); for doctors 2.23 (1967) and 0.85 (2005); for 
people with university/college education 1.75 (1967) and 0.79 (2005); for people with 
upper secondary school education 1.20 (1967) and 0.98 (2005). With the possible 
exception of mothers who are obstetricians, these numbers indicate that disparities have 
been eliminated during the 39-year period (Figure 2)17
 
.  
 
4.4    Does more advanced diagnostic technology lead to more Caesarean sections? 
 
We then went on to examine the impact of improved diagnostic technology. The analyses 
shown in Table 3, Columns I-V were carried out on the whole population of mothers for 
the period 1967-2005. The analyses with the technology variables had to be carried out 
on a sample with fewer observations (see the explanation given in Section 3.1). In order 
to check whether the sample with the technology variable differed from the whole 
population, we re-estimated the regression models in Table 3, Columns I and III using the 
smaller sample. These results are presented in Table 3, Columns VI and VII. The results 
are very similar to the results based on the complete set of observations (Columns I and 
III), which indicates that the sample is not biased. This is also supported by the 
descriptive results in Table 1, which show that both the percentage distribution and the 
mean values for the variables in the sub-sample and in the main sample are almost 
identical. 
 
In Table 5, Columns I and II, we assess the impact of the technology variables. In 
particular, use of 2-dimensional ultrasound and cardiotocography increase the probability 
for Caesarean section. The odds ratio for 2-dimensional ultrasound is 1.73 and for 
cardiotocography 1.75. The additive technology index also has a statistically significant 
positive effect on the probability (Column III). 
                                                 
16 In Table 4, we present significance tests for pairwise comparisons of the regression coefficients for the 
interaction terms. The coefficients for midwife · year and doctor · year were not statistically significantly 
different from each other at conventional levels. However, each of these two coefficients were statistically 
significantly different from the interaction terms for upper secondary school · year. 
17 An odds ratio of 1 signifies that there is no educational disparity, and an odds ratio of less than 1 implies 
that parents with compulsory school education have a higher probability of having a Caesarean section.  
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In Table 5, Model I we include a linear time trend. The regression coefficient for year is 
small in absolute value, and it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. This 
result suggests that the introduction of new technologies captures much of the effect that 
we ascribed to year in Table 3. This shows that new technology is part of the explanation 
for the increasing rate of Caesarean section in Norway over time. The size of the 
regression coefficients for the educational variables in Table 5 Columns I and II are 
similar to those in Table 3 Columns I, II and IV. Also the results from the significance 
tests for pairwise comparisons of the educational groups in Table 6 show very much the 
same pattern as those in Table 4. When the technology variables are included in the 
regression equations as additive factors, the educational disparities persist.  
 
 
4.5    Does more advanced diagnostic technology lead to fewer disparities in rates of  
   Caesarean section between expert and non-expert parents?  
 
In Table 5, Column IV we present the results where we have included interaction terms 
for education and technology. The mean value of the technology index for 1967 is zero 
(Table 1). This implies that we can assess disparities in 1967 by ignoring the interaction 
terms, and inspect the direct effects of the education variables in Model IV. With the 
exception of obstetricians, we observe that these estimates are much higher than the mean 
effects obtained in Models I-III. Accordingly, the disparities were highest in 1967, a 
finding that is consistent with the results from the previous analyses (Table 3, Columns 
III and V). 
 
The mean value of the technology index for 2005 is 3.45 (Table 1). By inserting this 
mean value into Model IV, we can calculate the disparities at the end of the period. We 
get the following odds ratios: obstetricians 1.73; midwives 1.06; doctors 1.01; 
university/college 0.92; upper secondary school 1.01. Similar to the results in Table 3, 
Columns III and V, we find that the educational disparities have been reduced from 1967 
to 2005 (Figure 3). The speed of convergence is highest for midwives and doctors, and 
lowest for parents with upper secondary school education (Table 5, Column IV and 
Table 618
 
). 
 
                                                 
18 In Table 6, we present significance tests for pairwise comparisons of the regression coefficients for the 
interaction terms. The coefficients for midwife · technology and doctor · technology were not statistically 
significantly different from each other at conventional levels. However, each of these two coefficients were 
statistically significantly different from the interaction terms for upper secondary school · technology. 
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4.6  Does our additional test support the agency model? 
 
In Table 7 we present the results from our additional test of the agency model. The 
elasticity for the odds of having a Caesarean section with respect to hospital revenue per 
bed was 0.24. This is as expected - more Caesarean sections are carried out when hospital 
revenue per bed increases (Column I). This effect is also fairly constant over time. From 
1988 and later, when the Caesarean rate levelled out, the elasticity of the odds of having 
a Caesarean section with respect to hospital revenue per bed is 0.24 (Table 7 Column 
IV). The corresponding elasticity for the period before 1988 is 0.29 (Column III). None 
of the interaction terms between educational groups and hospital revenue per bed were 
significant at conventional levels (p<0.05) (Column II). The logit coefficients were also 
small. This weakens the agency model. Variation in the Caesarean rate between 
educational groups is not influenced by the financial situation of the hospital. 
 
 
4.7 Effects of the control variables 
 
The estimates for the control variables are similar in Tables 3 and 5. The likelihood of a 
Caesarean section increases with mothers’ age. Weight of the child has a non-linear 
impact. Caesarean delivery is most prevalent when the baby is large (more than 4.5 
kilograms) and small (less than 2.5 kilograms). Previous Caesarean section, preeclampsia 
and abnormal presentation increase the likelihood of Caesarean section, while single 
baby birth decreases the likelihood of Caesarean section. Since many Caesarean sections 
can be planned ahead, surgical births are less likely to take place during weekends. Both 
non-western and western immigrants are more likely to have a Caesarean section than 
native Norwegian mothers. Large maternity units, ie. units with a large number of births,  
have a lower proportion of Caesarean section.  
 
 
5.   Discussion 
 
5.1  Interpretation and alternative explanations 
 
The focus of this study was to examine whether a publicly financed health care system 
discriminates against people with low education. We compare services provided to expert 
and non-expert patients to get a better grasp of the information problem involved. The 
statistical discrimination hypothesis suggests that patients with high education 
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communicate better with their doctor, and therefore they are likely to receive better 
treatment, than patients with low education. The hypothesis of agency discrimination 
suggests that doctors ration health care services, and more so when they treat patients 
with low education. 
 
Few studies have tested the statistical discrimination hypothesis (Balsa et al., 2005; 
Lutfey and Ketcham, 2005; McGuire et al., 2008). We believe that the current test is a 
strong one. First, we tested the statistical discrimination hypothesis against a competing 
hypothesis derived from agency theory. Second, knowledge and information were 
measured directly by distinguishing between super-expert parents (obstetricians), expert 
parents (doctors and midwives) and non-expert parents. Third, we explicitly tested 
whether disparities are reduced as a consequence of better diagnostic tests. Fourth, our 
dataset is sufficiently large to perform the statistical testing. Data covers the entire 
population of mothers who gave birth over a 39-year period. Hospitals started to use 
different technologies at different times, and this provides sufficient variation for 
empirical testing. 
 
It is also necessary to discuss alternative explanations for our findings. One factor to 
consider is the impact that mother’s preferences may have on Caesarean section rates.  
It may be that the preferences for Caesarean section of mothers with low education 
gradually get stronger over time. In that way educational disparities in Caesarean section 
rates decrease – similar to what we observe in our data. Such a possibility cannot be 
excluded, but is not very likely for the following reasons. First, the available evidence 
shows that the proportion of Caesarean sections that are carried out as a result of pressure 
from mothers, even if a Caesarean delivery is not medically indicated, is low. Extensive 
literature reviews conclude that the proportion of Caesarean sections that are carried out 
on the basis of the mother’s request is well under five percent in several studies (McCourt 
et al., 2007; Gamble et al., 2007; Lavender et al., 2006; Hildingsson et al., 2002). Second, 
if preferences are met, this is a phenomenon found particularly among resourceful 
women. Women with high education are more able to promote their wishes about their 
preferred method of delivery than women with low education (for a review of the 
relevant literature see: Bailit et al., 2004; Marx et al., 2001; Young, 2006; Weaver et al., 
2007). In this way, educational disparities in Caesarean section rates would be 
maintained, and would not decrease over time. To our knowledge, existing studies do not 
display a convergence of preferences among mothers with high and low education. 
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One exception that can probably be explained on the basis preferences, is the pattern of 
delivery for obstetricians. They are super experts and continue to have higher rates of 
Caesarean section than midwives, doctors and mothers in other educational groups 
throughout the whole period (Tables 3, 5)19
obstetricians  would favour a Caesarean section for themselves or for their partners even 
in an uncomplicated pregnancy (for a review see: Habiba et al., 2006). They prefer 
Caesarean section because of convenience, or because they are frightened of an ordinary 
delivery (Land et al., 2001; Savage and Francome, 2007). They also believe that 
Caesarean section is safer for both the mother and the child, even in cases for which the 
scientific evidence is weak. Unlike other mothers, obstetricians are in a much stronger 
position to have their preferences met, i.e. to get the type of delivery they desire. This 
will be the case even if the results from diagnostic tests show that a Caesarean section is 
not medically indicated. That obstetricians have more Caesarean sections than is 
medically indicated results in little extra cost for the hospital. Therefore, obstetricians 
who carry out Caesarean sections for this group of mothers have no reason to behave as 
the hospital’s agent for their own colleagues. Since the high Caesarean rate for 
obstetricians is governed more by preferences than by medical indications, there is 
therefore no basis for claiming that the service for mothers in all other educational 
groups is rationed. 
. This may reflect the obstetrician’s own 
personal preferences for Caesarean section. This is supported by studies that show that  
 
Another explanation, which is also relevant to discuss, is defensive medicine. It is 
possible that obstetricians carry out more Caesarean sections than there are medical 
indications for because of concern about malpractice liability. This issue has been studied 
particularly in the USA. Most of the studies from the USA have found a positive 
relationship between malpractice claims risk and the rate of Caesarean delivery (for a 
review of the literature see: Tussing and Wojtowycz, 1997; Symon, 2000; Brown, 2007). 
However, this issue is less relevant in Norway. We do not believe that our results have 
been influenced by defensive medicine. There are three reasons for this. 
 
First, the parents who have the most resources to complain and to take care of their 
interests are those with high education. If obstetricians practised defensive medicine, we 
would expect the Caesarean rate to be higher for those with high education than for those 
with low education. However, at the end of the period there was no difference between 
                                                 
19 This is in accordance with studies from other countries. For example, in one survey from the USA, 46 
percent of obstetricians reported that they would prefer a Caesarean section when they gave birth (Al-Mufti 
et al., 1997). The corresponding figure in a survey among female obstetricians in London was 31 percent 
(Gabbe and Holzman, 2001). These figures are well above the national figures for rates of Caesarean section 
in both the USA and Great Britain. 
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the education groups (with the exception of for obstetricians). We would not have 
expected this if doctors took account of which patient groups were most likely to 
complain. 
 
Second, obstetricians have no personal responsibility for compensation, either for the 
mother or the hospital, if something goes wrong with the delivery (Jørstad et al., 2007). 
In Norway, there is a public body (the Norwegian System of Compensation to Patients), 
which is responsible for compensation for all types of incorrect medical treatment 
(http://www.npe.no/). Therefore, obstetricians can recommend the type of delivery on the 
basis of medical criteria, without taking account of the risk of claims for compensation 
against themselves in the case of an adverse event.  
 
Third, in Norway, the risk for a doctor or a maternity unit to be involved in a case of 
complaint is low. This reduces the need for defensive medicine. For example, during the 
period 1988-2006, the Norwegian System of Compensation to Patients paid 
compensation for only 374 cases involving mothers or babies during delivery (Jørstad et 
al., 2007). This represents about 20 cases per year, which is a small number, taking into 
consideration the fact that about 60 000 babies are born in Norway each year. The 
Norwegian System of Compensation to Patients assesses the case for compensation and 
the amount of compensation. The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision assesses the 
consequences of the event for the professional practice of the doctor. During the period 
1993-2000, the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision withdrew the authorization of 
two obstetricians, and 37 doctors were given a warning for having acted in a way that 
was not in accordance with sound practice (Holmboe and Molne, 2001). These figures 
are also small. It may be that the amount of unsound treatment in maternity care is 
greater than the figures indicate. But underreporting reduces the risk of doctors and 
maternity units being involved in a case of complaint.  
 
 
5.2  Sufficient number of control variables  
 
One of the strengths of our data set is that it contains many relevant medical control 
variables, both for the mother and the child, and these variables are available at the 
individual level as far back as 1967. The effects of all the medical control variables are 
also as expected, and similar to the effects that have been found in other studies from 
Norway (Kolås et al., 2003; Tollånes et al., 2007). The effects are also similar to those 
that have been found in comparable international studies (for example see: Notzon et al., 
1994; Leitch and Walker, 1998; Odlind et al., 2003).  
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We cannot exclude the possibility that unobserved conditions associated with the 
mother’s health can have biased our results. However, we have data for several relevant 
variables for mother’s health status. An important control variable in our analysis is the 
baby’s birthweight. Epidemiological studies have shown that birthweight is strongly 
correlated with the health status of the mother (Emanuel et al., 1992; Kramer, 1987). If 
there is still unobserved heterogeneity in our data associated with the health of the 
mother, our dummy variables for birthweight will probably catch some of this. This will 
help to reduce any bias of our coefficients. 
 
Another factor to consider is the lack of information about access to prenatal care. 
Several studies have shown that good access to prenatal care prevents complications 
during delivery and helps to improve infant health (Arima et al., 2009; Currie and 
Gruber, 1996; Olds et al., 1986). This is also highlighted in WHO’s guidelines and 
recommendations for maternal care (Carroli et al., 2001; Villar et al., 1998). Since the 
1960s, all pregnant women in Norway have been offered free prenatal check-ups, and 
nearly all women have taken advantage of this offer (Blondel et al., 1985;  Miller, 1993). 
For example, in the middle of the 1990s, only 0.1% of pregnant women in Norway had 
not attended prenatal check-ups (Backe, 2001, Delvaux et al., 1999). We believe that, 
since access to prenatal care is so universal, also for mothers with low education, it is 
unlikely that the lack of information about prenatal visits has lead to any significant bias 
in the results. 
 
Another issue is that we lack control variables for the mental health status of the mother. 
The most relevant psychological factor is fear of childbirth (Saisto and Halmesmäki, 
2003). Serious fear of childbirth occurs in 6-10 % of pregnant women. The most 
important reason is a negative experience (pain) during a previous birth. Fear of 
childbirth is treated in several different ways: cognitive therapy and psychotherapy are 
used most often (Saisto and Halmesmäki, 2003; Nerum et al., 2006). A Caesarean 
delivery is an alternative in some cases, but is seldom used (Gamble and Creedy, 2000; 
Heimstad et al., 2006). This means that it is unlikely that lack of control for fear of 
childhood has lead to significant bias of our results. 
 
The non-medical control variables also have the expected effects. For example, most 
Caesarean sections are done on weekdays, which is more convenient for the staff and 
cost saving for the maternity unit. Our results also give support to the fact that larger 
maternity units have more complicated deliveries which lead to more Caesarean sections 
(Liu et al., 2007). Our results are also consistent with another Norwegian study, which 
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has found that midwives and doctors have a higher rate of Caesarean section than the rest 
of the population (Lehmann et al., 2007). One interesting finding is that non-western 
immigrant mothers are more likely to have a Caesarean section than Norwegian mothers. 
Two explanations have been suggested (Vangen et al., 2000; Kramer et al., 2000; Leone 
et al., 2008): First, several of the medical risk factors for a Caesarean section are more 
prevalent among immigrant mothers and their children than among Norwegian mothers 
and their children. For example, one risk factor – feto-pelvic disproportion  –  is 3-6 
times higher among immigrants from south-east Asia than among Norwegian women 
(Vangen et al., 2000). Second, there are non-medical differences in opinions and cultures 
between immigrant mothers and Norwegian mothers about when a Caesarean section is 
necessary. Most of the immigrants come from countries where the rate of Caesarean 
section is higher than in Norway, and where mothers are more used to having a 
Caesarean section on request. Our results show that even after we have taken medical 
risk factors into account, immigrant mothers have a higher probability of having a 
Caesarean section than Norwegian mothers. This indicates that Norwegian obstetricians 
accept the wishes of immigrant mothers, and take their wishes into account when 
deciding on type of delivery. 
 
 
5.3  Implications  
Based on our empirical analyses and the above discussion, we believe that we have 
reason to claim that our findings support statistical discrimination theory, and not agency 
theory. However, we have two reservations. First, we assume that parents do not have the 
ability to interpret new diagnostic tests, so the obstetrician’s ability to exert influence 
remains stable in the presence of new technology. If this is not the case, the arguments in 
favour of statistical discrimination theory are weakened. Second, when more objective 
tests are available, colleagues are in a better position to assess the reasons for the 
decisions made by the individual obstetrician. Peer pressure could make it harder for 
obstetricians to keep hospital costs low by keeping the rate of Caesarean section low. 
Such an interpretation is probably more in line with agency theory than statistical 
discrimination theory. 
 
However, if we accept that our analyses provide more support to statistical discrimination 
theory than to agency theory, an important implication of our findings is that 
communication between the doctor and the patient should be improved (Balsa et al., 
2005). Doctors are encouraged to listen more to their patients, in particular those from 
lower educational groups (Stewart 1995). The current study suggests that better 
diagnostic technology reduces the importance of patient-physician communication. The 
 25 
obstetrician is less dependent on interpreting the mother’s subjective assessment of how 
the birth is progressing. Since non-expert parents communicate less effectively than 
expert parents, they benefit the most from new technology. The proportion of the 
population with a high education has increased dramatically during the last 2-3 decades, 
particularly among young people (Lappegård, 1999). From a health policy point of view 
this is encouraging. More educated patients communicate better with the doctor than less 
educated patients. This improves the interaction between the patient and the doctor, 
which further leads to a more precise diagnosis and therefore better treatment.  
 
The increase in the Caesarean rate slowed down from about 1988 and later (Figure 1). 
This is a trend that has been reported in all the Nordic countries, and from Great Britain 
and the USA (Bergsjø, 2007;  Mayor, 2002; MacDorman et al., 2008). There is no 
satisfactory explanation for this trend. One possibility is that the authorities in these 
countries have become more aware of the cost to the health services and that hospital 
funding has been reduced with a consequent reduction in activity, including Caesarean 
sections. However, the trend in hospital budgets in Norway during the period of the study 
does not support this explanation. From 1980 until the mid 1990s, hospital revenue 
increased evenly by 1 percent per year. In other words, there was no indication of cost 
containment (Ministry of Health, 2002). From the mid 1990s, the increase was 3-4 
percent per year. Therefore, the levelling off of the Caesarean rate from 1988 and later 
occurred despite the fact that hospital revenue increased. So other explanations must be 
sought. Since this trend is seen in several countries, explanatory mechanisms that are 
relevant for different countries must be sought. 
 
This study was carried out in an homogenous population in which obstetricians have no 
private economic incentives to carry out more Caesarean sections than necessary. 
Caution must be used in generalizing the findings to other countries where maternity care 
is organized differently. This applies particularly to countries where many births take 
place in private clinics, in which the physicians/hospitals are reimbursed from private 
and public insurance for each delivery. Here, obstetricians will also often be remunerated 
in other ways than a fixed salary. For example, if obstetricians are remunerated on a fee-
for-service basis, there can be an incentive to carry out a Caesarean section rather than a 
vaginal delivery (for a review see: Keeler and Brodie, 1993). This is supported by studies 
that have shown that doctors carry out more Caesarean sections when they generate more 
income per delivery than a vaginal delivery (Gruber et al., 1999; Stafford, 1990). Gruber 
and Owings (1996) have also shown that doctors can maintain their income by carrying 
out more Caesarean sections, which generate more income than a vaginal delivery, when 
the fertility rate decreases. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that agency 
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discrimination may play a greater role in countries with more privatized maternity care, 
for example the USA. 
 
In conclusion, we find that expert parents have a higher rate of Caesarean section than 
non-expert parents. In the case of complications, the expert mother is in a better position 
to communicate her symptoms and her preferences for type of delivery than the non-
expert mother. The introduction of new diagnostic technology reduces clinical 
uncertainty about diagnosis and which type of delivery to choose. Since non-expert 
parents communicate less effectively than expert parents, they benefit the most from the 
new technology.  
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics  
Material with technology data
Variables (n)
Percent/ 
Mean 1 (n)
Percent/ 
Mean 1 (n)
Percent/ 
Mean 1 (n)
Percent/ 
Mean 1
Parents' highest education:
   obstetrician 66 323 0.01 2 249 602 0.03 56 421 0.03 1 575 764 0,03
   midwife 66 323 0.12 2 249 602 0.16 56 421 0.21 1 575 764 0,16
   doctor (excluding obstetricians) 66 323 0.39 2 249 602 0.92 56 421 1.66 1 575 764 0,91
   university/college education 2 61 254 17.37 2 116 503 36.57 48 163 55.56 1 489 226 37,51
   upper secondary school education 61 254 58.33 2 116 503 50.82 48 163 35.82 1 489 226 50,73
   compulsory school education 61 254 23.74 2 116 503 11.43 48 163 6.39 1 489 226 10,60
Mother's age:
   < 20 years 66 323 9.22 2 249 598 6.08 56 421 2.07 1 575 764 5,83
   20-30 years 66 323 68.28 2 249 598 67.51 56 421 53.16 1 575 764 67,27
   31-35 years 66 323 13.27 2 249 598 19.16 56 421 31.84 1 575 764 19,69
   36-40 years 66 323  7.22 2 249 598 6.30 56 421 11.39 1 575 764 6,31
   > 40 years 66 323 2.00 2 249 598 0.95 56 421 1.53 1 575 764 0,90
Birth weight:
   < 1000 g 66 134 0.20 2 244 993 0.27 56 302 0.37 1 574 343 0,26
   1000-1499 g 66 134 0.45 2 244 993 0.48 56 302 0.51 1 574 343 0,46
   1500-1999 g 66 134 0.95 2 244 993 0.98 56 302 1.16 1 574 343 0,97
   2000-2499 g 66 134  2.84 2 244 993 2.76 56 302 2.82 1 574 343 2,78
   2500-2999 g 66 134 11.77 2 244 993 10.85 56 302 10.71 1 574 343 10,75
   3000-3499 g 66 134 32.91 2 244 993 31.19 56 302 30.12 1 574 343 30,78
   3500-3999 g 66 134 34.34 2 244 993 34.73 56 302 34.56 1 574 343 34,75
   4000-4499 g 66 134 13.50 2 244 993 15.17 56 302 15.84 1 574 343 15,50
   >= 4500 g 66 134 3.04 2 244 993 3.58 56 302 3.91 1 574 343 3,74
Characteristics of the birth:
   Caesarean section 66 323 1.78 2 249 602 9.59 56 421 16.53 1 575 764 10,34
   Caesarean section previously  -  - 2 249 602 4.62 56 421 8.44 1 575 764 5,19
   abnormal presentation 3 66 323 3.44 2 243 867 5.63 56 035 9.82 1 575 764 6,02
   single baby birth 66 323 98.07 2 249 602 97.50 56 421 96.15 1 575 764 97,40
   weekend 4 66 323 26.96 2 249 602 25.01 56 421 25.52 1 575 764 24,87
Predisposing factors - mother:
   asthma 66 323 0.16 2 249 602 1.95 56 421 3.99 1 575 764 2,20  
   diabetes 66 323 0.11 2 249 602 0.31 56 421 0.75 1 575 764 0,30
   epilepsy 66 323 0.22 2 249 602 0.55 56 421 0.74 1 575 764 0,57
1967 Whole material 2005
Table 1 (continued)
Material with technology data
Variables (n)
Percent/ 
Mean 1 (n)
Percent/ 
Mean 1 (n)
Percent/ 
Mean 1 (n)
Percent/ 
Mean 1
   heart disease 66 323 0.06 2 249 602 0.19 56 421 0.57 1 575 764 0,20
   chronic hypertension 66 323 0.03 2 249 602 0.26 56 421 0.44 1 575 764 0,28
   chronic kidney failure 66 323 0.03 2 249 602 0.13 56 421 0.35 1 575 764 0,14
   rheumatoid arthritis 66 323 0.05 2 249 602 0.25 56 421 0.23 1 575 764 0,27
   preeclampsia 5 66 323 2.13 2 249 602 3.01 56 421 3.98 1 575 764 3,20
   bleeding during pregnancy 66 323 1.63 2 249 602 2.29 56 421 4.20 1 575 764 2,47
Mother's immigrant background:
   non-western immigrant 66 323 0.21 2 249 602 4.08 56 421 12.69 1 575 764 4,02
   western immigrant 66 323 2.05 2 249 602 2.30 56 421 2.89 1 575 764 2,15
Maternity unit - production:
   number of births  66 323 1314.75 2 233 880 1814.75 52 796 2513.26 1 575 764 2043,37
(1096.75) (1335.88) (1716.12) (1360.97)
   number of Caesarean sections  66 323 21.27 2 233 880 181.42 52 796 387.67 1 575 764 206,70
(23.85) (189.38) (255.71) (191.48)
Maternity unit - technology:
   ultrasound 30 184 0 1 575 764 77.51 46 391 100.00 1 575 764 77.51
   cardiotocography 30 184 0 1 575 764 80.05 46 391 100.00 1 575 764 80.05
   ST waveform analysis 30 184 0 1 575 764 19.59 46 391 75.54 1 575 764 19.59
   foetal blood analyses 30 184 0 1 575 764 32.51 46 391 70.29 1 575 764 32.51
technology index (0-4) 30 184 0 1 575 764 2.09 46 391 3.45 1 575 764 2.09
(1.24) (0.64) 1 575 764 (1.24)
1 Mean value and standard deviation in brackets are given for: number of births, number of Caesarean sections and technology index 
2 Excluding obstetricians, midwives and doctors
3 Including breech presentation, transverse presentation, abnormal cephalic presentation and other
4 The birth was on a Saturday or a Sunday
5 Including unspecified, mild and severe preeclampsia
1967 Whole material 2005
Table 2
Distribution of selected independent variables according to mother's level of education1. Percent
Mother's age
Mother's highest education: n > 35 years Non-western Western < 2500 g  >= 3500 g    Epilepsy
   Chronic 
hypertension
   
Rheumatoid 
arthritis
   Chronic 
kidney failure
   Obstetrician 265 34,0 10,2 54,7 0 0 0
   Midwife 3 695 21,6 1,4 5,1 4,6 58,2
   Doctor (excluding obstetricians) 7 260 19,4 4,5 8,9 4,2 57,8 0,4
   University/college education 2 589 785 9,4 2,5 3,2 3,8 58,0 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,2
   Upper secondary school education 985 350 6,0 1,9 1,4 4,3 54,2 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,1
   Compulsory school education 592 645 6,9 5,2 1,1 5,4 48,8 0,7 0,2 0,3 0,1
1  Empty cells:  figures are not reported due to low number of individuals in these groups
2  Excluding obstetricians, midwives and doctors
Immigrant background Birth weight Predisposing factors - mother
   Diabetes
0,5
0,3
0,3
0,3
   
Table 3
Effects of parents' highest level of education on Caesarean sections in Norway 1967-2005.                   
Data from the Medical Birth Registry. Logistic regressions with random effects. Multilevel analysis. T-values in parentheses
 
Intercept -2.671 * -4.291 * -2.806 * -5.119 -5.313 1.700 * 1.425 *
 (11.5) (21.1) (12.3) (2.82) (2.95) (11.6) (9.78)
Time variable:
   year 0.019 * 0.029 * 0.029 * 0.039 * 0.020 * 0.029 *
(52.8) (36.1) (106.9) (51.4) (47.7) (31.3)
Parents' highest education: 4
   obstetrician 0.494 * 0.381 * 0.823 * 0.517 * 0.803 * 0.536 * 0.994 *
(4.01) (3.03) (2.85) (4.22) (2.81) (3.61) (2.86)
   midwife 0.297 * 0.238 * 0.907 * 0.292 * 0.873 * 0.343 * 0.905 *
(5.37) (4.21) (6.98) (5.28) (6.77) (5.29) (5.67)
   doctor (excluding obstetricians) 0.226 * 0.182 * 0.801 * 0.237 * 0.757 * 0.201 * 0.875 *
(9.09) (7.19) (12.5) (9.53) (11.8) (6.72) (11.05)
   university/college education 5 0.089 * 0.043 * 0.558 * 0.092 * 0.533 * 0.079 * 0.573 *
(9.22) (4.38)  (26.4) (9.51) (25.3) (7.00) (22.4)
   upper secondary school education 0.086 * 0.053 * 0.178 * 0.085 * 0.183 * 0.070 * 0.153 *
(9.21) (5.59) (9.08) (9.10) (9.40) (6.45) (6.45)
Interaction terms:
   obstetrician  · year -0.016 -0.014 -0.022
(1.28) (1.14) (1.43)
  midwife · year -0.028 * -0.026 * -0.025 *
(5.32) (5.14) (3.97)
   doctor · year -0.025 * -0.023 * -0.028 *
(10.3) (9.47) (9.53)
   university/college · year -0.020 * -0.019 * -0.021 *
(23.6) (22.5) (20.4)
   upper secondary school · year -0.005 * -0.005 * -0.004 *
(6.04) (6.44) (4.50)
Mother's age: 6
   < 20 years -0.072 *  -0.047 * -0.050 * -0.065 * -0.045 * -0.070 * -0.047 *
(5.29) (3.39) (3.67) (4.82) (3.31) (4.41) (2.95)
   31-35 years 0.153 * 0.182 * 0.160 * 0.154 * 0.162 * 0.135 * 0.142 *
(23.4) (27.3) (24.5) (23.7) (24.8) (17.8) (18.8)
   36-40 years 0.471 * 0.528 * 0.484 * 0.471 * 0.484 * 0.450 * 0.464 *
(50.3) (55.1) (51.6) (50.4) (51.6) (41.2) (42.3)
   > 40 years 0.959 * 1.060 * 0.980 * 0.958 * 0.978 * 0.953 * 0.975 *
(45.4) (48.9) (46.3) (45.4) (46.3) (38.2) (39.0)
Birth weight: 7
   < 1000 g 1.435 * 1.430 * 1.434 * 1.444 * 1.444 * 1.539 * 1.541 *
(42.0) (41.0) (41.9) (42.4) (42.2) (36.9) (36.9)
   1000-1499 g 2.309 * 2.334 * 2.313 * 2.304 * 2.309 * 2.380 * 2.386 *
(96.1) (94.1) (96.0) (96.0) (95.9) (82.4) (82.4)
VIII II III IV V VI
Without fixed effects for maternity unit With fixed effects for maternity unit Without fixed effects for maternity unit 3
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 2
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Table 3 (continued)
 
   1500-1999 g 2.040 * 2.070 * 2.044 * 2.032 * 2.036 * 2.048 * 2.054 *
(117.4) (115.6) (117.3) (117.0) (117.0) (99.5) (99.5)
   2000-2499 g 1.192 * 1.207 * 1.195 * 1.190 * 1.192 * 1.168 * 1.171 *
(96.1) (94.9) (96.1) (96.0) (96.0) (80.4) (80.4)
   2500-2999 g 0.431 * 0.432 * 0.432 * 0.431 * 0.432 * 0.425 * 0.426 *
(49.8) (48.8) (49.8) (49.8) (49.8) (42.3) (42.2)
   3500-3999 g -0.159 * -0.154 * -0.159 * -0.159 * -0.159 * -0.160 * -0.159 *
(22.8) (21.7) (22.8) (22.8) (22.8) (19.8) (19.7)
   4000-4499 g -0.046 * -0.038 * -0.046 * -0.048 * -0.048 * -0.053 * -0.053 *
(5.46) (4.35) (5.41) (5.64) (5.59) (5.43) (5.39)
   >= 4500 g 0.402 * 0.419 * 0.403 * 0.399 * 0.400 * 0.042 * 0.425 *
(30.8) (31.5) (30.9) (30.5) (30.6) (28.4) (28.5)
Characteristics of the birth:
   Caesarean section previously 2.47 * 2.440 * 2.470 * 2.472 * 2.466 * 2.497 * 2.492 *
(329.8) (318.9) (328.6) (329.2) (328.2) (292.2) (291.2)
   abnormal presentation 8 2.267 * 2.303 * 2.270 * 2.258 * 2.261 * 2.294 * 2.298 *
 (314.1) (310.4) (314.06) (313.3) (313.3) (276.0) (276.0)
   single baby birth  -0.271 *  -0.288 *  -0.272 *  -0.272 * -0.273 * -0.309 *  -0.309 *
(21.7) (22.6) (21.8) (21.8) (21.9) (21.2) (21.3)
   weekend 9 -0.497 * -0.489 * -0.49.7 * -0.498 * -0.497 * -0.496 * -0.495 *
(73.3) (70.7) (73.1) (73.4) (73.2) (63.0) (62.9)
Predisposing factors - mother:
   asthma 0.200 * 0.231 * 0.194 * 0.186 * 0.180 * 0.192 * 0.187 *
(12.42) (14.0) (12.0) (11.5) (11.1) (10.5) (10.2)
   diabetes 1.748 * 1.800 * 1.748 * 1.758 * 1.759 * 1.631 * 1.632 *
(59.9) (60.5) (59.8) (60.4) (60.4) (45.5) (45.4)
   epilepsy 0.372 * 0.376 * 0.371 * 0.369 * 0.367 * 0.410 * 0.408 *
(12.5) (12.4) (12.4) (12.4) (12.3) (11.9) (11.8)
   heart disease 0.257 * 0.357 * 0.266 * 0.251 * 0.259 * 0.192 * 0.199 *
(5.26) (7.16) (5.44) (5.14) (5.29) (3.28) (3.40)
   chronic hypertension 0.375 * 0.364 * 0.373 * 0.371 * 0.368 * 0.392 * 0.390 *
(10.2) (9.81) (10.1) (10.1) (10.0) (9.13) (9.08)
   chronic kidney failure 0.213 * 0.333 * 0.211 * 0.208 * 0.207 * 0.194 * 0.191 *
(3.59) (5.50) (3.55) (3.51) (3.48) (2.80) (2.76)
   rheumatoid arthritis 0.452 * 0.375 * 0.443 * 0.447 * 0.438 * 0.426 * 0.418 *
(10.9) (8.90) (10.6) (10.7) (10.5) (8.78) (8.60)
   preeclampsia 10 1.301 * 1.312 * 1.301 * 1.305 * 1.306 * 1.286 * 1.287 *
(125.3) (123.6) (125.1) (125.7) (125.6) (106.2) (106.1)
   bleeding during pregnancy 0.192 * 0.243 * 0.193 * 0.190 * 0.190 * 0.184 * 0.186 *
(12.5) (15.4) (12.5) (12.3) (12.3) (10.4) (10.5)
VIII II III IV V VI
Without fixed effects for maternity unit With fixed effects for maternity unit Without fixed effects for maternity unit 3
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 2
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Table 3 (continued)
 
Immigrant background:
   non-western immigrant 0.215 * 0.221 * 0.194 * 0.233 * 0.214 * 0.268 * 0.247 *
(15.7) (15.8) (14.0) (17.0) (15.6) (16.5) (15.2)
   western immigrant 0.079 * 0.084 * 0.074 * 0.080 * 0.075 * 0.096 * 0.091 *
(4.32) (4.47) (4.04) (4.38) (4.11) (4.32) (4.09)
Maternity unit - production:
   number of births  (log) -0.655 * -0.356 * -0.651 * -0.748 * -0.737 *
(43.5) (20.3) (43.1) (38.6) (38.0)
   number of Caesarean sections  0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 *
(52.8) (33.9) (54.5) (45.3) (46.7)
Concordant value 0.825 0,829 0,826 0,832 0,833 0,819 0,819
N 2 082 763 2 082 763 2 082 763 2 082 763 2 082 763 1 483 735 1 483 735
1 Year continuous
2 Year dummies
3 Here the number of observations are the same as the number of observations we have when the technology variable is used instead of the year (see Table 5).
4 Reference category: compulsory school
5 Excluding obstetricians, midwives and doctors
6 Reference category: 20 - 30 years
7 Reference category: 3000 - 3499 g
8 Including breech presentation, transverse presentation, abnormal cephalic presentation and other
9 The birth was on a Saturday or a Sunday
10 Including unspecified, mild and severe preeclampsia
* p<0.05
VIII II III IV V VI
Without fixed effects for maternity unit With fixed effects for maternity unit Without fixed effects for maternity unit 3
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 2
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
Table 4
Significance test for pairwise comparisons of the different educational groups1 and of the different interaction terms for education and year2
Wald Chi-Square test.  p-values in brackets
Education with and without year obstetrician midwife doctor (excluding obstetricians) university/college
3 obstetrician  
· year
midwife 
· year
doctor
· year
university/college
· year
Education:
   midwife 4.43(0.03)
   doctor (excluding obstetricians) 6.05(0.01)
0.16
(0.68)
   university/college education3
14.41
 (<0.01)
11.12
(<0.01)
45.04
 (<0.01)
    upper secondary school education 15.46(<0.01)
13.24
(<0.01)
54.75
 (<0.01)
8.25
(<0.01)
Education with year:
   midwife · year  0.38(0.53)
   doctor · year  0.35(0.55)
0.02
(0.88)
   university/college · year  0.02(0.87)
1.58
(0.20)
5.86
(0.01)
   upper secondary school · year 1.36(0.24)
20.68
(<0.01)
94.62
(<0.01)
943.56
(<0.01)
1 Estimated on the basis of the regression coefficients in Table 3, column I.
2 Estimated on the basis of the regression coefficients in Table 3, column III.
3 Excluding obstetricians, midwives and doctors
Additive model    Model with interaction terms
Table 5
Effects of parents' highest level of education on Caesarean sections in Norway 1967-2005.   Technology variables included.
Data from the Medical Birth Registry. Multilevel analysis. T-values in parentheses.
Maternity units for which we have information about medical technology
Intercept 0.958 * 0.948 * 1.994 * 1.779 *
(6.49) (6.42) (13.8) (12.2)
Time variable:
   year -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0004
(1.69) (0.36) (0.69)
Parents' highest education: 2
   obstetrician 0.453 * 0.454 * 0.514 * 0.407
(3.01) (3.02) (3.44) (1.10)
   midwife 0.286 * 0.286 * 0.326 * 0.849 *
(4.36) (4.36) (5.02) (5.44)
   doctor (excluding obstetricians) 0.162 * 0.161 * 0.190 * 0.600 *
(5.37) (5.35) (6.34) (7.70)
   university/college education 3 0.041 * 0.040 * 0.070 * 0.422 *
(3.63) (3.55) (6.22) (17.6)
   upper secondary school education 0.043 * 0.042 * 0.064 * 0.141 *
(3.89) (3.86) (5.92) (6.42)
Maternity unit - technology:
   ultrasound 0.548 * 0.537 *
(34.8) (37.1)
   cardiotocography 0.562 * 0.555 *
(35.5) (36.1)
   ST waveform analysis -0.069 * -0.079 *
(5.99) (7.90)
   foetal blood analyses -0.059 * -0.066 *
(5.21) (6.17)
technology index (0-4) 0.249 * 0.317 *
(38.9) (32.4)
Interaction terms:
   obstetrician · technology 0.040
(0.28)
   midwife · technology -0.228 *
(3.71)
   doctor · technology  -0.171 *
(5.99)
   university/college · technology -0.148 *
 (16.0)
  upper  secondary school · technology -0.038 *
(4.35)
Mother's age: 4
   < 20 years -0.048 * -0.047 * -0.064 * -0.050 *
(3.02) (2.97) (4.06) (3.19)
   31-35 years 0.155 * 0.154 * 0.139 * 0.144 *
(20.3) (20.2) (18.4) (19.0)
   36-40 years 0.489 * 0.488 * 0.460 * 0.468 *
(44.1) (44.1) (42.0) (42.6)
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
I II III IV
Table 5 (continued)
   > 40 years 1.022 * 1.022 * 0.971 * 0.984 *
(40.3) (40.3) (38.8) (39.3)
Birth weight: 5
   < 1000 g 1.560 * 1.560 * 1.541 * 1.542 *
(37.0) (37.0) (36.9) (36.9)
   1000-1499 g 2.425 * 2.425 * 2.393 * 2.395 *
(82.3) (82.3) (82.5) (82.4)
   1500-1999 g 2.078 * 2.078 * 2.059 * 2.060 *
(99.1) (99.1) (99.7) (99.6)
   2000-2499 g 1.184 * 1.184 * 1.174 * 1.175 *
(80.2) (80.3) (80.6) (80.5)
   2500-2999 g 0.425 * 0.425 * 0.426 * 0.426 *
(41.7) (41.7) (42.2) (42.2)
   3500-3999 g -0.157 * -0.157 * -0.159 * -0.159 *
(19.2) (19.25) (19.7) (19.7)
   4000-4499 g -0.047 * -0.048 * -0.052 * -0.052 *
(4.77) (4.81) (5.27) (5.25)
   >= 4500 g 0.435 * 0.434 * 0.427 * 0.427 *
(28.8) (28.8) (28.6) (28.6)
Characteristics of the birth:
   Caesarean section previously 2.471 * 2.470 * 2.492 * 2.489 *
(286.0) (286.3) (291.6) (290.7)
   abnormal presentation 6 2.312 * 2.311 * 2.298 * 2.300 *
 (273.8) (273.9) (275.7) (275.7)
   single baby birth -0.325 * -0.325 * -0.310 * -0.311 *
(22.1) (22.1) (21.3) (21.4)
   weekend 7 -0.490 * -0.490 * -0.495 * -0.494 *
(61.6) (61.6) (62.8) (62.7)
Predisposing factors - mother:
   asthma 0.215 * 0.213 * 0.198 * 0.196 *
(11.7) (11.6) (10.9) (10.7)
   diabetes 1.682 * 1.681 * 1.646 * 1.645 *
(46.3) (46.3) (45.8) (45.7)
   epilepsy 0.408 * 0.408 * 0.409 * 0.407 *
(11.7) (11.7) (11.8) (11.8)
   heart disease 0.245 * 0.244 * 0.204 * 0.208 *
(4.15) (4.12) (3.48) (3.56)
   chronic hypertension 0.375 * 0.374 * 0.389 * 0.388 *
(8.67) (8.65) (9.06) (9.03)
   chronic kidney failure 0.255 * 0.254 * 0.210 * 0.209 *
(3.65) (3.63) (3.03) (3.01)
   rheumatoid arthritis 0.374 * 0.374 * 0.417 * 0.415 *
(7.64) (7.64) (8.60) (8.54)
   preeclampsia 8 1.291 * 1.290 * 1.287 * 1.287 *
(105.1) (105.1) (106.1) (106.0)
   bleeding during pregnancy 0.211 * 0.211 * 0.192 * 0.193 *
(11.9) (11.8) (10.9) (10.9)
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
I II III IV
Table 5 (continued)
Immigrant background:
   non-western immigrant 0.273 * 0.272 * 0.272 * 0.261 *
(16.7) (16.6) (16.8) (16.1)
   western immigrant 0.095 * 0.095 * 0.096 * 0.096 *
(4.21) (4.21) (4.33) (4.30)
Maternity unit - production:
   number of births  (log) -0.700 * -0.699 * -0.799 * -0.789 *
(34.0) (34.0) (40.6) (40.1)
   number of Caesarean sections  0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 *
(46.4) (49.5) (47.5) (48.0)
Concordant value 0,821 0.821 0.819 0.820
N 1 483 735 1 483 735 1 483 735 1 483 735
1 Year continuous
2 Reference category: compulsory school
3 Excluding obstetricians, midwives and doctors
4 Reference category: 20 - 30 years
5 Reference category: 3000 - 3499 g
6 Including breech presentation, transverse presentation, abnormal cephalic presentation and other
7 The birth was on a Saturday or a Sunday
8 Including unspecified, mild and severe preeclampsia
* p<0.05
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients
Regression 
coefficients 1
Regression 
coefficients 1
I II III IV
Table 6
Significance test for pairwise comparisons of the different educational groups1 and of the different interaction terms for education and technology index2.
Wald Chi-Square test.  p-values in brackets
Education with and without technology 
index obstetrician midwife
doctor 
(excluding 
obstetricians)
university/college3
obstetrician  
· technology
midwife
· technology
 doctor 
· technology
university/college 
· technology 
Education:
   midwife 1.80(0.17)
   doctor (excluding obstetricians) 4.92(0.02)
2.85
(0.09)
   university/college education3
9.54
 (<0.01)
14.10
(<0.01)
18.84
 (<0.01)
    upper secondary school education 9.86(<0.01)
15.00
(<0.01)
21.19
 (<0.01)
1.31
(0.25)
Education with technology index
   midwife · technology  2.54(0.11)
   doctor · technology  1.80(0.17)
0.62
(0.43)
   university/college · technology  1.60(0.20)
1.20
(0.27)
0.26
(0.60)
   upper secondary school · technology 0.21(0.64)
8.99
(<0.01)
22.17
(<0.01)
370.17
(<0.01)
1 Estimated on the basis of the regression coefficients in Table 5, column III.
2 Estimated on the basis of the regression coefficients in Table 5, column IV.
3 Excluding obstetricians, midwives and doctors
Additive model    Model with interaction terms
Table 7
Effects of hospital revenue per bed on Caesarean sections in Norway 1976-1999.                   
Data from the Medical Birth Registry. Logistic regressions with fixed effect for hospital and year. Multilevel analysis. T-values in parentheses
Intercept 1.164 2.789 -0.987 -2.118 *
 (0.00) (0.00) - (49.1)
Revenue variable:
   hospital revenue per bed (log) 0.245 * 0.182 * 0.297 * 0.240 *
(8.37) (3.70) (5.39) (5.40)
Parents' highest education: 1
   medical education 0.234 * 0.310 * 0.257 * 0.224 *
(8.05) (4.41) (5.63) (5.88)
   university/college education 2 0.052 * 0.027 0.069 * 0.043 *
(4.25) (0.99) (3.60) (2.68)
   upper secondary school education 0.053 * 0.005 0.051 * 0.055 *
(4.45) (0.22) (2.76) (3.51)
Interaction terms:
   medical education · hospital revenue per bed -0.128
(1.11)
   university/college · hospital revenue per bed 0.049
(1.05)
  upper secondary school · hospital revenue per bed 0.092
(1.96)
Mother's age: 3
   < 20 years 0.012 0.012 0.078 * -0.033
(0.71) (0.73) (3.45) (1.27)
   31-35 years 0.177 * 0.177 * 0.195 * 0.170 *
(21.3) (21.3) (13.7) (16.5)
   36-40 years 0.568 * 0.569 * 0.771 * 0.488 *
(46.4) (46.5) (36.1) (32.4)
   > 40 years 1.129 * 1.129 * 1.489 * 0.963 *
(39.0) (39.0) (30.7) (26.6)
Birth weight: 4
   < 1000 g 1.566 * 1.566 * 0.775 * 1.900 *
(37.1) (37.1) (9.39) (37.1)
   1000-1499 g 2.638 * 2.638 * 2.047 * 3.094 *
(83.7) (83.7) (41.0) (71.1)
   1500-1999 g 2.280 * 2.280 * 2.033 * 2.474 *
(101.4) (101.3) (57.4) (82.9)
   2000-2499 g 1.295 * 1.295 * 1.305 * 1.305 *
(82.6) (82.6) (53.0) (63.6)
   2500-2999 g 0.447 * 0.447 * 0.455 * 0.447 *
(41.3) (41.3) (26.8) (31.5)
   3500-3999 g -0.180 * -0.180 * -0.200 * -0.164 *
(20.5) (20.5) (14.4) (14.4)
   4000-4499 g -0.081 * -0.081 * -0.145 * -0.036 *
(7.49) (7.49) (8.14) (2.62)
I II III IV
Whole material Material with subsamples
Additive model
Interactions between 
education and hospital 
revenue per bed
Sample with data 
1976-1987
Sample with data 
1988-1999
Table 7 (continued)
   >= 4500 g 0.380 * 0.380 * 0.222 * 0.473
(22.6) (22.6) (7.58) (22.8) *
Characteristics of the birth:
   Caesarean section previously 2.505 * 2.505 * 2.897 * 2.352 *
(268.7) (268.7) (173.2) (206.6)
   abnormal presentation 5 2.423 * 2.423 * 2.321 * 2.536 *
 (254.8) (254.8) (156.7) (201.3)
   single baby birth -0.418 * -0.418 * 0.143 * -0.689 *
(26.1) (26.1) (5.01) (34.5)
   weekend 6 -0.487 * -0.487 * -0.483 * -0.488
(56.7) (56.7) (34.8) (44.2)
Predisposing factors - mother:
   asthma 0.209 * 0.209 * 0.190 * 0.220 *
(9.63) (9.63) (4.47) (8.63)
   diabetes 1.871 * 1.871 * 2.473 * 1.600 *
(46.8) (46.8) (35.7) (32.3)
   epilepsy 0.398 * 0.399 * 0.362 * 0.429 *
(10.37) (10.3) (5.73) (8.74)
   heart disease 0.412 * 0.413 * 0.592 * 0.339 *
(5.55) (5.56) (4.24) (3.84)
   chronic hypertension 0.425 * 0.425 * 0.615 * 0.344 *
(8.92) (8.92) (7.66) (5.80)
   chronic kidney failure 0.423 * 0.422 * 0.459 * 0.401 *
(4.36) (4.35) (2.69) (3.36)
   rheumatoid arthritis 0.377 * 0.377 * 0.317 * 0.412 *
(7.78) (7.78) (3.38) (7.22)
   preeclampsia 7 1.369 * 1.369 * 1.443 * 1.325 *
(103.5) (103.5) (69.1) (76.6)
   bleeding during pregnancy 0.226 * 0.225 * 0.238 * 0.252 *
(10.5) (10.5) (8.15) (8.02)
Immigrant background:
   non-western immigrant 0.293 * 0.294 * 0.243 * 0.312 *
(17.3) (17.4) (6.29) (16.4)
   western immigrant 0.086 * 0.086 * 0.121 * 0.057
(3.72) (3.72) (3.12) (1.95)
Concordant value 0.813 0,813 0.807 0.818
N 1 167 334 1 167 334 515 580 651 754
1 Reference category: compulsory school
2 Excluding medical education
3 Reference category: 20 - 30 years
4 Reference category: 3000 - 3499 g
5 Including breech presentation, transverse presentation, abnormal cephalic presentation and other
6 The birth was on a Saturday or a Sunday
7 Including unspecified, mild and severe preeclampsia
* p<0.05
Whole material Material with subsamples
Additive model
Interactions between 
education and hospital 
revenue per bed
Sample with data 
1976-1987
Sample with data 
1988-1999
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Fig.1.  Odds for Caesarean section for different educational groups by year 
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Fig. 2.  Odds ratio for Caesarean section for different educational groups relative to the reference category   
            (compulsory school),  1967 and 2005 
1967 
2005 
1.00 
1.50 
2.34 
1.82 
1.53 
1.15 
1.73 
1.06 
1.01 
0.92 
1.01 
Obstetrician Midwife Doctor University/college  Upper secondary school  
Fig. 3.  Odds ratio for Caesarean section for different education groups relative to the reference category  
            (compulsory school),  according to technology 
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